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INTRODUCTION
Most trusting relationships involve clearly defined parties. A banker and
her customer or a physician and his patient know who will rely on whom.
Questions may arise as to the exact nature of the expectations each party has of
the other or the scope of the entrusted matter, but both sides have no doubt as
to the identity of the affected parties. Similarly, when the entrustor engages
the entrusted party to act for a beneficiary, the entrusted party can identify the
entrustor and the beneficiary. Furthermore, both of these parties may assert
claims against the entrusted party for mismanagement or malfeasance.
For an important class of actors, however, indeterminacy as to the affected
party or parties exists on one side of the trusting relationship. Charitable trusts
serve an unspecified set of beneficiaries, sometimes characterized as the
general public.
Indeed, this characteristic distinguishes them from
conventional trusts with a limited and determined class of beneficiaries. Most
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charities now operate in not-for-profit corporate form, with no stockholders,
and they similarly serve an indeterminate set of ultimate beneficiaries.
This attribute – that charities operate for the benefit of the general public
rather than a restricted and identified class of beneficiaries – shapes the legal
accountability of charities. Donors transfer property to a charity so that it can
provide a public benefit. Once the donor has made the gift, however, the donor
traditionally has no legal standing to call the charity to account.1 Recent
changes to trust law allow donors to sue in order to enforce express conditions
on a gift, but continue to limit donor standing when the gift lacks explicit
limitations.2 Donors to charities in corporate form generally continue to lack
standing even as to conditions on a gift.3 Recipients of benefits from a charity
likewise lack standing to sue. Individuals who might derive goods or services
from the charity’s actions ordinarily cannot bring the institution to account in
court for misbehavior.4 It falls to the state attorney general to defend the
public’s interest in the charity’s conduct of its affairs.5 These officers have
many other duties, however, and the extent of supervision of not-for-profit
activities tends to range from the reactive to the inactive.6
1

Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State
Responsibility, 73 HARV. L. REV. 433, 447 (1960) (“[I]t is universally held that contributors
to public charities have no standing to enforce the duties of their fiduciaries.”).
2 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(c) (amended 2005) (“The settlor of a charitable trust, among
others, may maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust.”); id. § 405 cmt. (contrasting
Uniform Trust Code § 405(c) with the 1959 Restatement (Second) of Trusts and referencing
Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and
Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593 (1999) as a source “[f]or the law on the enforcement of
charitable trusts”); Gary, supra, at 617 (“[E]xcept for donors who have made restricted gifts,
donors will not have standing to take legal action against the fiduciaries.”). Over twenty
jurisdictions have adopted the Uniform Trust Code. Legislative Fact Sheet – Trust Code,
UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trust%20
Code (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).
3 See, e.g., Hardt v. Vitae Found., Inc., 302 S.W.3d 133, 138-39 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009)
(distinguishing between charitable trust law and charitable corporation law to hold that the
donor to a non-profit charitable corporation had no standing to enforce the conditions and
terms of the donation).
4 See, e.g., Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 28 (1976) (holding that
indigent defendants lacked standing to sue the Treasury Secretary and the Internal Revenue
Commissioner for “issuing a Revenue Ruling allowing favorable tax treatment to a
nonprofit hospital that offered only emergency-room services to indigents”). For a
discussion of beneficiary standing, see Lefkowitz v. Lebensfeld, 415 N.E.2d 919, 921 (N.Y.
1980).
5 See Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L.
REV. 37, 43 (1993) (“[The state attorney general] does have the power to bring suit to
enforce the charitable purposes of the organization.”).
6 See id. at 42-43; Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State
Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 939 (2004) (“[A]s a practical matter, few state
attorneys general have the funding and inclination to engage in aggressive charity
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The officers and directors of a charitable enterprise operate subject to the
twin duties of care and loyalty in acting for the institution.7 When matters do
come to court, judges give great deference to the institution’s actions that are
based on honest judgment.8 Legislation in some instances relieves a charity’s
officers and directors of liability for all but the worst duty violations.9 As a
practical matter, the legal regime accords the decision makers of not-for-profits
great scope in defining for themselves the nature of their mission and the
manner in which they carry it out. In this sense they can select the particular
subgroup of individuals who will benefit most directly from the charity’s
activities.
The broad scope accorded to the managers of a charity and the weak
oversight resulting from the legal standing rules create risks of frustration, or
worse, for a trusting relationship. For some not-for-profits, American society
has responded with direct regulation of aspects of their operation. Health
institutions constitute a prime example. For others, the legal system relies on
the members and supporters of the institution who have direct contact with it to
provide primary oversight through the mechanism of “voting” with their feet or
their checkbooks. Churches provide an example of not-for-profit institutions
for which direct governmental involvement would violate important norms.
Instead of direct government involvement in churches, society relies on those
closest to the institution to monitor its activities. Other not-for-profit
institutions sell services in partially competitive markets, where market

enforcement.”).
Some recent scholarship has criticized certain attorney general
interventions as harmful. Id. at 940-43 (arguing that parochialism and paternalism have
motivated attorneys general to initiate harmful interventions into the activities of charitable
boards); Jonathan Klick & Robert H. Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and
Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey’s Kiss-Off, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 755-59
(2008) (explaining that the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s intervention in the Hershey
Trust’s sale of a controlling interest in the Hershey Company exposed the trust to
unnecessary costs and risks).
7 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. §§ 310, 315 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007) (describing a board member’s duty of loyalty and duty of care to the organization).
8 See, e.g., Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 622 N.W.2d 876, 883 (Minn. 2003) (“[W]e
conclude that the boards of nonprofit corporations may receive the protection of the
business judgment rule.”); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 365
(Tentative Draft No. 1, Partial Reprint, 2008) (describing the business judgment rule that
protects board members from duty of care claims).
9 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1605(1) (2010) (providing immunity from liability to
uncompensated officers and directors of nonprofit organizations except for certain conduct,
including fraud, intentional breach of a fiduciary duty, and wanton behavior); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 231, § 85K (2008) (limiting the liability of uncompensated directors, officers, and
trustees of charitable educational institutions to “damage or injury . . . caused by willful or
wanton misconduct”).
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discipline may constrain some behaviors. For example, not-for-profit
performing arts companies compete for audiences with for-profit enterprises.
Federal tax rules that qualify the institution for tax exemption10 and allow it
to receive tax-deductible donations11 provide limited constraints for not-forprofit organizations. Liberal in scope, these rules establish outer bounds of
conduct but generally do not seriously inhibit the institution’s choice of
activities within this framework. A qualifying charity must be organized and
operated “exclusively” for one or more broadly specified purposes, such as
educational or religious.12 These purposes grant in practice an enormous range
of choice for exempt organizations. Almost one million not-for-profit
organizations exist and qualify for exempt status,13 creating a welcome
decentralization and diffusion of charitable sector decision making.
All charitable not-for-profits operate subject to a nondistribution rule. The
charity may not distribute any part of its income to the charity’s insiders.14
Professor Hansmann posited that this attribute cured a particular kind of
market failure and enhances trust.15 Those who pay for the services offered by
some charities cannot easily verify whether and how performance took place.16
For example, the donor of a relief package for delivery in a third world country
cannot easily check whether the charity made the delivery or whether it simply
pocketed the funds.17 The nondistribution constraint reassures donors that the
individuals in control of the charity have no direct personal incentive to
profit.18 The possibility that the charity could enrich its managers in other
ways, however, weakens the constraint. High salaries and elaborate fringe
benefits can substitute to some extent for direct distributions.19 The tax law
requires that compensation of charity managers meet a reasonableness test, but
the test allows for considerable flexibility.20

10

I.R.C. § 501 (2006).
Id. § 170.
12 Id. § 501(c)(3).
13 KENNARD T. WING, KATIE L. ROEGER & THOMAS H. POLLAK, URBAN INST., THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF: PUBLIC CHARITIES, GIVING, AND VOLUNTEERING, 2010, at 1
(2010), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412209-nonprof-public-charities
.pdf (stating that more than 950,000 organizations qualified for 501(c)(3) status in 2008).
14 See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (2010) (“An organization is not operated
exclusively for one or more exempt purposes if its net earnings inure in whole or in part to
the benefit of private shareholders or individuals.”).
15 Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 844-49
(1980).
16 Id. at 847.
17 See id. at 846-47.
18 Id. at 847.
19 Id. at 844.
20 See 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-6 (2010) (applying a rebuttable presumption of
reasonableness to the compensation arrangements of nonprofit executives).
11
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For any particular institution, different constituencies may trust the not-forprofit to behave in a particular way – to distribute food to the needy, educate
children, or support performing arts. Conflict arises when the institution seeks
to make changes that disappoint one or more of the trusting groups. As an
example, if an organization engaged in funding research on breast cancer
decided instead to provide supportive care for children with cancer,
disagreement and conflict could arise.21
This Essay discusses one example of change, the proposed sale by Fisk
University of certain unique works of art. Much valuable artwork resides in
not-for-profit institutions, primarily museums. As the American Association
of Museums Code of Ethics states: “Museums make their unique contribution
to the public by collecting, preserving, and interpreting the things of this
world.”22 Museums qualify for tax exemption as serving “educational”
purposes.23 These general goals may require the officers and directors to
choose among different strategies and different constituencies of the museum.
The choices become more complex when the institution that owns the art
performs other educational missions that overshadow its museum-like
functions. Works of art generate great passion in viewers, critics, and even
others who may never have seen the works. The works combine aesthetic
values, historical perspectives, and philosophical dimensions in a unique
physical object. The desire to maintain and preserve a work in its place can
equal the care and concern shown for a loved one. Some artworks sell for
millions of dollars, and their monetary value both adds to their allure and raises
the stakes for institutional decision making. Each work is unique. The
paradox lies in the fact that many millions of unique objects exist.
Support for an institution – both public and private – flows from and creates
expectations as to the nature of the public benefits that the institution will
provide. These expectations may differ and sometimes may conflict. As
already noted, broad discretion allows the institution’s decision makers to
choose the particulars of the activities in which a museum or other recipient of
artworks will engage. The institution often cannot fulfill all of the different
roles that its supporters expect of it.

21

“[T]hose who give to a home for abandoned animals do not anticipate a future board
amending the charity’s purpose to become research vivisectionists.” Attorney Gen. v.
Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E.2d 1011, 1021 n.18 (Mass. 1986) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
22 Code of Ethics for Museums, AM. ASS’N OF MUSEUMS (2000), http://www.aamus.org/museumresources/ethics/coe.cfm.
23 See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii) example 4 (2010); Code of Ethics for Museums,
supra note 22 (“Museums serve society by advancing an understanding and appreciation of
the natural and cultural common wealth through exhibitions, research, scholarship,
publications, and educational activities.”).
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The possibility of conflicting expectations becomes more probable when an
educational institution functions only secondarily as a conservator of the
valuable artworks. The institution may seek to realize the monetary
appreciation in its art, by way of sale or otherwise, in order to support its other
purposes. The strong expectation that a museum or other educational
institution will hold and preserve the artworks it owns in perpetuity renders
decisions to sell or otherwise dispose of any of the works highly controversial.
Museum professionals strongly discourage deaccessioning, except when the
institution reinvests the proceeds in other artwork.24 They condemn sale of
works for other purposes, such as support for the institution’s day-to-day
operations.25 Sale of a work removes it from public view and places it in
private hands, away from public view. In a recent example, the National
Academy – a prestigious institution “that integrates a museum, art school, and
association of artists and architects”26 – sold two Hudson River paintings in
2008 for $15 million.27 It planned to use the money for its operating budget
and general maintenance.28 The Association of Art Museum Directors
imposed sanctions on the Academy that included banning loans of artworks
from other Association members as well as other program collaborations.29
In many cases, once a proposed sale of art becomes public, the outcry from
donors, critics, and others causes the institution to reverse course and to
continue to retain the work. For major, high-profile institutions, the decision to
sell a work of art frequently follows from the need for money to fund the
purchase of something of importance. But even a plan to purchase other
artworks with the proceeds of the sale can generate controversy. Use of the
sale proceeds for building maintenance, construction of a new facility, or other
24

AAMD TASK FORCE ON DEACCESSIONING, AAMD POLICY ON DEACCESSIONING 4
(2010), available at http://www.aamd.org/papers/documents/FINALDEACCESSIONING
REPORT060910.pdf (“Funds received from the disposal of a deaccessioned work . . . may
be used only for the acquisition of works in a manner consistent with the museum’s policy
on the use of restricted acquisition funds.”); ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS., ART MUSEUMS
AND THE PRACTICE OF DEACCESSIONING (2007), available at http://www.aamd.org/papers/
(approving deaccessioning when “[p]roceeds from a deaccessioned work are used only to
acquire other works of art”).
25 AAMD TASK FORCE ON DEACCESSIONING, supra note 24, at 4 (“Funds received from
the disposal of a deaccessioned work shall not be used for operations or capital expenses.”);
ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS., supra note 24 (stating that deaccessioning proceeds should
never be used “as operating funds, to build a general endowment, or for any other
expenses”).
26 About Us, NATIONAL ACADEMY, http://www.nationalacademy.org/pageview.asp?mid=
4&pid=94 (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
27 Donn Zaretsky, AAMD Rules Need To Be Deaccessioned, ART IN AM. (Mar. 31, 2009),
http://www.artinamericamagazine.com/news-opinion/the-market/2009-03-31/aamd-rulesneed-to-be-deaccessioned/.
28 Id.
29 Id.
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purposes that do not preserve a unique work of art in the collection almost
certainly brings a loud chorus of negatives.
Another example involved the monumental painting Numbers, 1964, which
Jasper Johns created specifically for the north lobby wall of the New York
State Theater at Lincoln Center.30 The painting hung in that same location for
thirty-five years.31 In December 1998 the Lincoln Center Board endorsed the
idea of selling the painting, for which it had received offers of up to $15
million.32 The Board would have applied the funds to repair and improve the
buildings at Lincoln Center.33 Criticism from the artist, major donors, and
Philip Johnson – who was one of the theater’s architects – caused the Board to
reverse itself one month later.34 The Chairwoman and the President of Lincoln
Center then opined that they would raise the needed money without selling
assets.35
As noted, more complex issues arise when the museum function of the
institution exists within a larger frame that serves a different but related
purpose. Several universities recently have sought to sell artworks. Arts
professionals assert that an institution’s responsibility with respect to a unique
work consists primarily in preservation. When a university rather than a
museum owns artwork, however, the institutional calculus becomes more
complex. The university appropriately considers the educational value of the
artworks, their relationship to the core educational mission, and the
university’s capacity to derive maximum educational utility from continued
ownership of the work. Other educational needs may deserve higher priority.
The public reaction to any proposed sale often fails to balance the school’s
multiple obligations. Just as discontinuing a program of study brings angry
disappointment, a plan to dispose of works of art generates howls of protest.
In each of several recent instances, when a university proposed to dispose of
artworks, vocal opposition emerged from contributors, beneficiaries, and the
general public. This public protest usually slowed and often prevented a sale.
Thus, when Brandeis University planned to reduce some of its operating
deficit in early 2009 by closing its Rose Art Museum and selling the museum’s
valuable collection of contemporary works, the angry chorus of critics and

30 Carol Vogel, Outcry at Talk of Selling Lincoln Center Art, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1999,
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/11/theater/outcry-at-talk-of-selling-lincoln-centerart.html; Editorial, How Not to Sell a Public Painting, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1999,
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/25/opinion/how-not-to-sell-a-public-painting.html.
31 Vogel, supra note 30.
32 Carol Vogel, Lincoln Center Drops Plan To Sell Its Jasper Johns Painting, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/26/nyregion/lincoln-center-dropsplan-to-sell-its-jasper-johns-painting.html.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
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donors quickly produced an about-face.36 The trustees had proposed giving up
a museum facility with low attendance but high-value assets in order to shore
up what they saw as the primary mission of the university.37 In the face of
vocal opposition, the Brandeis administration later agreed to seek revenue from
the artworks through loan programs, not sales.38
In one instance with a different outcome, in 2006 Thomas Jefferson
University decided to sell The Gross Clinic by Thomas Eakins.39 Alumni of
this medical school in 1878 collected $200 for the institution to buy a painting
of a beloved professor performing a bloody operation on a man’s thigh.40 The
work since has gained acknowledgement as one of the great nineteenth-century
American canvases.41 The University proposed to sell the work for $68
million to the Crystal Bridges Museum of American Art and the National
Gallery of Art.42 After hearing bitter criticism of the proposal, the University
offered to allow the painting to remain in Philadelphia if it received a
comparable offer.43 Contributors and cultural foundations raised the money
and the Philadelphia Museum of Art and the Pennsylvania Academy of the
Fine Arts now share the work.44 The Chairman of Jefferson’s Board of
Trustees stated that “the retention and preservation of [the painting was]
outside the scope of [the University’s] central mission,” and selling it would
allow the school to focus on its “essential responsibility to educate, teach and
heal.”45
36

Daniel Grant, Is the University’s Museum Just a Rose To Be Plucked?, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 3, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123361710970041349.html.
37 Randy Kennedy & Carol Vogel, Outcry Over a Plan To Sell Museum’s Holdings, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/28/arts/design/28rose.html?_r=2.
38 Geoff Edgers, Brandeis To Loan Art To Boost Budget: Museum, Sotheby’s Team Up
To Ease Crunch, BOSTON GLOBE, May 28, 2010, http://www.boston.com/ae/theater_arts/
articles/2010/05/28/brandeis_may_loan_out_rose_art_for_a_fee/.
39 Press Release, Thomas Jefferson Univ., Thomas Jefferson University Trustees Agree
to Sale of The Gross Clinic (Nov. 11, 2006), available at http://www.jefferson.edu/eakins/
documents/Eakins_Release_FINAL_%2011_10_06.pdf.
40 Carol Vogel, Eakins Masterwork Is To Be Sold to Museums, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/11/arts/design/11pain.html.
41 The Eakins Gallery: The Gross Clinic, T. JEFFERSON U., http://www.jefferson.edu/eak
ins/grossclinic.cfm (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
42 Vogel, supra note 40.
43 Id.
44 Press Release, Phila. Museum of Art, Newly Restored, Eakins’s ‘The Gross Clinic’ To
Be Centerpiece of Exhibition Shedding New Light on Artist’s Original Vision (July 18,
2010), available at http://www.philamuseum.org/press/releases/2010/824.html.
45 Press Release, Thomas Jefferson Univ., supra note 39 (internal quotation marks
omitted). A similar outcry emerged when the Boston Athenaeum proposed to sell its Gilbert
Stuart portraits of George and Martha Washington. See The Stuart Solution, AM. HERITAGE,
Aug.-Sept. 1980, at 110, 110, available at http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/maga
zine/ah/1980/5/1980_5_110.shtml.
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This Essay analyzes one recent controversy concerning a university’s
proposed sale of artworks. The case of Georgia O’Keeffe Foundation
(Museum) v. Fisk University46 raised a number of issues relevant to trust:
fidelity to donors; respect for historic mission; choice of current educational
practices; designation of the appropriate public beneficiaries; and issues of race
and place.
I.
A.

GEORGIA O’KEEFFE FOUNDATION V. FISK UNIVERSITY

Fisk University

Fisk University, Nashville’s oldest college, held its first classes in January
1866.47 From its initial focus on educating poor African Americans and former
slaves, Fisk has become a respected research university48 and ranks in the top
half dozen of historically black universities in the United States.49 It currently
enrolls about 700 students, approximately half of whom come from lowincome families.50 Fisk has had financial difficulties, however, and has
operated at a deficit averaging $2 million annually in recent years.51
Fisk brought suit in 2005 in Davidson County Chancery Court, seeking a
declaratory judgment to allow it to sell two works of art in order to restore its
endowment and improve the mathematics, business, and science departments.52
The Fisk University Galleries house works of modern and contemporary
African-American artists, contemporary African art and mainstream
contemporary art, as well as the Alfred Stieglitz Collection,53 the subject of the
litigation discussed below. The University acquired both of the works it
proposed to sell by gift from Georgia O’Keeffe in the late 1940s and early

46 312 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). At the heart of this case was Fisk University’s
desire to sell artworks originally received as donations subject to certain conditions,
including a no-sale provision. Id. at 4-5.
47 Georgia O’Keeffe Found. v. Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. Ch. Ct.
Feb. 8, 2008), vacated, 312 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009); Fisk’s Storied Past, FISK,
http://www.fisk.edu/AboutFisk/HistoryOfFisk.aspx (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
48 Fisk’s Storied Past, supra note 47.
49 In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, slip op. at 5 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Aug. 20, 2010),
available at http://tn.gov/attorneygeneral/cases/fisk/fiskorder.pdf.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 6-7 (“Fisk . . . regularly runs a two million dollar deficit annually.”); Marybeth
Gasman, Leadership and Fund Raising at Fisk University, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Nov.
15, 2010, 9:03 PM), http://chronicle.com/blogs/innovations/what%E2%80%99s-happeningat-fisk/27857 (reporting that Fisk University is averaging a $2 million annual deficit).
52 Georgia O’Keeffe Found., 312 S.W.3d at 4.
53 Fisk University Galleries: Collections, FISK, http://www.fisk.edu/campuslife/FiskUniv
ersityGalleries/Collections.aspx (last visited Feb. 19, 2011).
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1950s and displayed them as part of the Stieglitz Collection.54 The more
famous of the two works, Radiator Building – Night, New York, was valued in
the millions of dollars.55
B.

The Stieglitz Collection

Alfred Stieglitz, a famous pioneering photographer and collector of modern
American art, died in 1946, survived by his wife Georgia O’Keeffe, a famous
artist in her own right, and a disabled daughter.56 His estate included about
900 works of art, including photographs.57 The will named Ms. O’Keeffe
executrix of the estate and granted her a life interest.58 Article Third of
Stieglitz’s will provided that, upon Ms. O’Keeffe’s death, any artworks not
previously disposed of would go to charities under arrangements that “assure
to the public . . . access thereto to promote the study of art.”59 The will also
authorized transfers of funds from the estate to cover expenses of managing
and preserving the artwork.60 Article Second of the will gave Ms. O’Keeffe
power to transfer property from the estate to such charities as she might
select.61
Under then applicable New York law, a testator could not make
testamentary gifts to charity of more than fifty percent of the estate if a spouse
or child survived.62 A special guardian for the daughter raised the possibility
that the will violated this prohibition.63 To resolve this problem, Ms.
O’Keeffe, with probate court approval, exercised her power under Article
Second to transfer all the estate’s artworks and photographs, constituting less
than fifty percent of the estate, to not-for-profit institutions.64 Ms. O’Keeffe
waived her right to appoint any remaining property to charity, individually and
for the estate.65 She then obtained a life estate in the remainder of the Stieglitz
estate.66

54

Georgia O’Keeffe Found., 312 S.W.3d at 4, 7.
See id. at 5.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 See N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 17 (1909) (repealed 1967) (“No person having a
husband, wife, child or parent, shall, by his or her last will and testament, devise or bequeath
to any benevolent, charitable . . . association or corporation, in trust or otherwise, more than
one-half part of his or her estate . . . .”); Georgia O’Keeffe Found., 312 S.W.3d at 5-6.
63 Georgia O’Keeffe Found., 312 S.W.3d at 5-6.
64 Id. at 6.
65 Id.
66 Id.
55
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Ms. O’Keeffe selected six not-for-profit recipients of the artworks.67 Five of
the grantee institutions constituted conventional art repositories.68 Fisk
University, the sixth, was not.69 Ms. O’Keeffe did not state why she selected
Fisk University as one of the recipients, other than once describing the gift as
“a good thing to do.”70 The most likely reason involves Carl Van Vechten, a
photographer, critic, and writer, who had a “working relationship” with both
Stieglitz and O’Keeffe.71 As a friend of Charles Johnson, the first black
President of Fisk, Van Vechten seems to have played the decisive role of
intermediary.72 Ms. O’Keeffe had no other known connection to Fisk.73 At
the time, Nashville was a racially segregated city.74 A gift of valued artworks
to a black university in that context made a significant social statement.75
Viewed from a present-day perspective, however, the nature of the social
statement contains ambiguity. Was it an affirmation that a black college
deserved to own first-class, mainstream artwork? Or, as the Chancery Court
later opined, was it an effort to promote integration in the city because whites
could visit Fisk but blacks would not have been welcome in all-white
institutions?76
In her letter transferring title to ninety-seven pieces from the Stieglitz estate
to Fisk, Ms. O’Keeffe wrote that Fisk would not at any time sell or exchange
any of the objects in the Stieglitz Collection.77 Fisk’s President, Charles
Johnson, acknowledged the assignment and transfer of the artworks and
repeated that Fisk would not sell or exchange the works in the collection.78

67

Id.
See id. (listing the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, the Philadelphia
Museum of Art, the National Gallery of Art in Washington, the Art Institute of Chicago, and
the Library of Congress as five of Ms. O’Keeffe’s donees).
69 Id. at 21 (Dinkins, J., concurring) (“[T]he primary mission of Fisk is education and . . .
it was the only university amongst the donees of Alfred Stieglitz’s artwork.”).
70 Georgia O’Keeffe Found. v. Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, slip op. at 9 (Tenn. Ch. Ct.
Feb. 8, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), vacated, 312 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2009).
71 Id. at 10.
72 Id. at 9-10.
73 Id. at 9.
74 See id. at 2-3, 8-9.
75 Id. at 8-9.
76 See id. at 8 (“The donation to an African-American university made a public statement
and gesture to heighten the consciousness of a segregated society that African Americans
and their institutions ranked equally, among and as a vital part of American society and the
cultural arts.”).
77 Georgia O’Keeffe Found. (Museum) v. Fisk Univ., 312 S.W.3d 1, 6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2009).
78 Id. at 6.
68
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Prior correspondence had set out other conditions for display of the works,
including that the collection “be exhibited intact.”79 In addition to the
assignments from the Stieglitz estate, Ms. O’Keeffe contemporaneously
transferred to Fisk four paintings from her personal collection on permanent
loan, to be exhibited as part of the Stieglitz Collection.80 Over the next several
years, Ms. O’Keeffe gave those paintings to Fisk.81 The artworks gifted from
Stieglitz’s estate and the paintings gifted from Ms. O’Keeffe’s personal
collection included the two paintings Fisk had asked the court for permission
to sell.82
Fisk established and maintained a separate gallery to house the Stieglitz
Collection, named the Van Vechten Gallery.83 Although it includes works by
renowned artists such as Picasso, Cezanne, and Renoir, as well as Stieglitz’s
own work,84 the collection attracts relatively few visitors each year.85
C.

The Court Proceedings

In its initial petition to the court, Fisk argued that the conditions applicable
to the Stieglitz Collection did not apply to the four paintings O’Keeffe had
given individually.86 The court found, however, that contemporaneous
statements by Ms. O’Keeffe showed that she intended the paintings to become
part of the Stieglitz Collection, and accordingly held the restrictions applicable
to them.87 The University then argued that its current financial condition
rendered it incapable of maintaining the collection intact and moved the court
to allow a sale under the doctrine of cy pres.88 The Georgia O’Keeffe
Foundation sought to intervene, claiming that a sale would violate the
conditions of the gift and that the collection accordingly should revert to the
Foundation, as successor in interest to Ms. O’Keeffe.89 The Foudation’s

79

Id.
Id. at 7.
81 Id.
82 See id. at 4.
83 Id. at 21 (Dinkins, J., concurring).
84 Fisk University Galleries: The Carl Van Vechten Gallery, FISK, http://www.fisk.edu/
campuslife/FiskUniversityGalleries/CarlVanVechtenGallery.aspx (last visited Feb. 11,
2011).
85 See Lee Rosenbaum, Fisk at Frist: AG Proposes “Temporary Arrangement” for
Stieglitz Collection, ARTSJOURNAL (Sept. 14, 2010, 11:27 AM), http://www.artsjournal.com/
culturegrrl/2010/09/ (estimating visitors to the Stieglitz Collection at five to seven people a
day).
86 Georgia O’Keeffe Found. v. Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Ch. Ct.
Feb. 8, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), vacated, 312 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2009).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 3-4.
89 Georgia O’Keeffe Found. (Museum) v. Fisk Univ., 312 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tenn. Ct. App.
80
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succession in interest came about after Georgia O’Keeffe died in 1986,
prompting a will contest.90 As part of the settlement, the parties created the
Georgia O’Keeffe Foundation and designated it as the residuary beneficiary of
the O’Keeffe estate.91 Over Fisk’s objections, the court granted the
Foundation’s motion to intervene in the Fisk case, after which the Foundation
transferred all its assets, including any interest in this litigation, to the Georgia
O’Keeffe Museum.92 The court then substituted the Museum as intervenor.93
The court later admitted the Attorney General of Tennessee as an additional
intervenor.94
While the case was pending, Fisk asked the court to approve an agreed
settlement with the Georgia O’Keeffe Museum to sell Radiator Building to it
for $7.5 million.95 Subsequently, Fisk presented a broader settlement
agreement for its approval, this time with the Crystal Bridges Museum of
Bentonville, Arkansas.96 Alice Walton, the Walton Foundation, and members
of the Walton family had contributed $317 million to create Crystal Bridges as
a premier American art museum and center.97 Under the proposal, Crystal
Bridges would pay Fisk $30 million for an undivided half interest in the
collection.98 Fisk and Crystal Bridges each would display the collection for six
months of each year.99 The proposed sale to Crystal Bridges thus would
reallocate some of Fisk’s ownership rights to a public institution pursuing an
arts education mission, keeping the works out of private hands, while enabling
Fisk to proceed with its proposed educational improvements.
In a series of rulings, the Chancery Court found against Fisk.100 Applying
the substantive law of the state where the gift took place, New York, it held
that the gift documents between Ms. O’Keeffe and Fisk created an implied
reverter in Ms. O’Keeffe that had passed on her death to the Foundation and
then to the Museum.101 The Museum thus had standing to enforce the no-sale

2009).
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 7-8.
93 Id. at 8.
94 Id.
95 Id. 8-9.
96 Id. at 9.
97 Wal-Mart Heiress’s Art Museum May Be Delayed, USA TODAY (Mar. 10, 2009, 5:00
AM), http://www.usatoday.com/travel/destinations/2009-03-10-crystal-bridges-museum_N.
htm.
98 Georgia O’Keeffe Found., 312 S.W.3d at 5.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 8-10.
101 Id. at 9-10. Applying an interest analysis to the choice of law question, perhaps
Tennessee law should have applied. It is unclear whether a different result would have
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and other conditions.102 These conditions, the court held, continued to apply to
Fisk and extended to the four paintings Ms. O’Keeffe had given.103 Further,
the court denied cy pres relief on two grounds: first, that Ms. O’Keeffe had a
specific rather than a general charitable intent in making the gift and therefore
if Fisk could not carry out its terms the collection should be returned to her or
her heirs;104 and second, as to the proposed sale of a half interest to the Crystal
Bridges museum, that Ms. O’Keeffe wanted the collection to reside at Fisk to
make a social statement and that a transfer would dilute this intention.105 The
court accordingly denied Fisk’s petition to sell the collection.106 Fisk appealed
the rulings.107
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.108 It determined first that the
Stieglitz gift did not create a reversion in Ms. O’Keeffe, and therefore the
Museum had no property interest in the collection.109 The Museum
accordingly lacked standing.110 Ms. O’Keeffe had a life estate in the Stieglitz
estate and a limited power of appointment, both of which terminated upon her
death.111 She exercised the power in favor of six charitable institutions and
renounced any further exercise of the power.112 Her estate and its successors
in interest received no rights in the artworks from the estate after her death.113
As to the four paintings Ms. O’Keeffe donated individually, her letters
evidencing the gifts make no mention of any reversionary interest.114
Expressions by Ms. O’Keeffe of dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the
University’s maintenance of the artworks evidenced frustration, but not any
reversion.115 To the contrary, they show she believed her gift had transferred
all ownership rights and that she lacked the right to revoke the gift.116

obtained in any event.
102 Id. at 9.
103 Georgia O’Keeffe Found. v. Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Ch. Ct.
Feb. 8, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), vacated, 312 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2009).
104 Id. at 5, 20.
105 Id. at 22.
106 Id. at 23.
107 Georgia O’Keeffe Found., 312 S.W.3d at 10.
108 Id. at 20.
109 Id. at 13.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 12-13.
113 Id. at 13.
114 Id. at 14.
115 Id.
116 See id.
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The appellate court also held that Fisk could qualify for cy pres relief.117 It
found Ms. O’Keeffe demonstrated a general rather than a specific charitable
intent.118 The simultaneous gifts made to other institutions, the court said,
fortified this conclusion.119 She wanted to make the collection available for
educational study to the public “in Nashville and the South.”120 This phrase,
which the lower court and the parties later took as a guiding principle, does not
appear in Ms. O’Keeffe’s letters to Fisk’s President Johnson nor in Alfred
Stieglitz’s will.121 On remand, the court said, Fisk would need to show that a
change in circumstances had occurred rendering literal compliance with the
conditions impracticable.122 Upon such a showing, the trial court should
fashion relief close to Ms. O’Keeffe’s original intent.123 A concurring judge
added that the cy pres relief also should take account of Fisk’s primary mission
as an educational institution.124
On remand, the Chancery Court held a trial on the cy pres issues highlighted
by the appellate court.125 In its August 2010 opinion, it found that Fisk had
indeed suffered continuing financial difficulties that satisfied the change of
circumstances condition for cy pres.126 To come as near as possible to the
donor’s intent, however, the collection should remain available for study in
Nashville and the South.127 The court stated eight reasons why the proposed
agreement with Crystal Bridges Museum did not meet this standard.128 It
directed the University and the Attorney General to submit alternative
proposals.129 Fisk and Crystal Bridges modified their proposed agreement to
meet the court’s objections.130 The Attorney General proposed a temporary
plan for housing the collection elsewhere in Nashville, contingent on funding
approval from outside sources.131

117

Id. at 15.
Id. at 19.
119 Id. at 18.
120 Id. at 19.
121 See id.
122 Id. at 20.
123
Id.
124 Id. at 22 (Dinkins, J., concurring).
125 In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Aug. 20, 2010),
available at http://tn.gov/attorneygeneral/cases/fisk/fiskorder.pdf.
126 Id. at 4, 6-7.
127 Id. at 12-13.
128 Id. at 13-15.
129 Id. at 16.
130 In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, slip op. at 19-20 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Nov. 3, 2010),
available at http://tn.gov/attorneygeneral/cases/fisk/fiskorder11-3-2010.pdf.
131 Id. at 18.
118
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Finally, in November 2010, the court, seeking a more permanent solution,
rejected the Attorney General’s plan and approved a modified version of the
agreement with Crystal Bridges.132 It conditioned its approval on setting aside
$20 million of the $30 million purchase price in a segregated endowment fund,
the income of which would secure the continued maintenance of the Stieglitz
Collection.133 Fisk initially estimated that it was spending $131,000 per year
on collection maintenance.134 Evidence at trial established that “[b]est
[p]ractices” for the collection would require $1.3 million annually.135 Fisk
would have no access to the escrowed fund or management of the principal.136
In the event Fisk filed for bankruptcy, creditors would have no rights in the
fund, which would pass, with the collection, to a new fiduciary.137 Fisk will
appeal the order.138
II.

RELEVANT INTERESTS

The Fisk case revolves around a valuable asset. The Stieglitz Collection
represents important historic, educational, and aesthetic values. It also carries
substantial monetary value. The collection provides present benefits to Fisk,
students and other visitors to the Van Vechten Gallery, and the City of
Nashville. The sale Fisk proposed raises questions as to who should receive
the benefits of owning and displaying the collection in the future and who
should decide how to allocate those benefits. Several different interests appear
in this case. Which deserve attention, assuming consideration started afresh
without the existing legal or doctrinal frameworks? Whose trust and
expectations should matter? Answers to these questions can help determine
the proper parties to a lawsuit to decide the future of the collection.
A.

Fisk University

Consider the claims of Fisk, given its status as a university, from two
perspectives: its current educational mission and its historic importance as a
black college. Fisk cannot survive as an institution if it runs perpetual deficits.
In carrying out its mission of educating students, Fisk constantly must make
choices as to which activities should receive support and resources. Budget
shortfalls constrain those choices. The need to reduce expenses led Fisk to

132

Id. at 21-25.
Id. at 2-3.
134 In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, slip op. at 7 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Aug. 20, 2010).
135 In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, slip op. at 30 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Nov. 3, 2010) (citing
trial exhibit).
136 Id.
137 Id. at 31-34.
138 Robin Pogrebin, Fisk University Plans To Appeal Ruling on Stieglitz Art Sale, ARTS
BEAT (Dec. 1, 2010, 8:44 PM), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/01/fisk-university
-plans-to-appeal-ruling-on-stieglitz-art-sale/.
133
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eliminate degree programs in dramatic speech and dance and in philosophy and
religion.139 Fisk’s proposal to strengthen science, business, and mathematics
forwards its core function to enable low-income, African-American students to
enjoy enhanced educational options.140 The University rationally might choose
to put resources toward science, business, and mathematics in preference to
educating some of its students through the Stieglitz Collection. As the first
college in Nashville and a leading historically black college, its alumni and
members of the larger public expect the institution to continue in its mission.
To do so, Fisk sought to restore its finances by selling a valuable asset. Even
within its arts education program, Fisk rationally might prefer to emphasize the
art of African and African-American artists whose works Fisk also displays,
rather than the more conventional iconic works of the white mainstream.
As the litigation progressed, Fisk developed the proposal to share the
Stieglitz Collection with the Crystal Bridges Museum.141 The proposal enables
Fisk to enjoy the collection for half the time and to monetize some of its
value142 – to have its cake and eat it too.
B.

The Crystal Bridges Museum

Creation of a new museum, even one with great financial resources, presents
unique difficulties. Crystal Bridges needs to acquire first-class works for its
collection. As a latecomer to the museum world, it finds that most of the
artwork it would want already resides in the permanent collections of other
institutions. The acquisition of a part interest in the Stieglitz Collection
enables Crystal Bridges to fulfill its mission of creating an important collection
of American art in Bentonville, Arkansas.143
C.

The Georgia O’Keeffe Museum

This museum preserves Ms. O’Keeffe’s artistic reputation and legacy and
provides research and study of American Modernism.144 The Museum
collection of more than 3,000 works includes 1,149 by Ms. O’Keeffe.145
Acquisition of additional O’Keeffe works would further enhance the
collection. Secondarily, maintenance of a public collection attached to her

139

In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, slip op. at 6 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Aug. 20, 2010).
See Our Mission & Values, FISK, http://www.fisk.edu/AboutFisk/OurMissionAnd
Values.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
141 In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, slip op. at 19 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Nov. 3, 2010).
142 Id.
143 See
About Crystal Bridges, CRYSTAL BRIDGES MUSEUM OF AM. ART,
http://crystalbridgesmuseum.org/public/about-2/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
144 Museum History, GEORGIA O’KEEFFE MUSEUM, http://www.okeeffemuseum.org
/history.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
145 Id.
140
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name advances the Museum’s core objective of making Ms. O’Keeffe’s work
available to the public.146 The arrangement between Fisk and Crystal Bridges
forwards this objective by making the Stieglitz Collection available to a wider
potential audience.
D.

Nashvillians

Both the Court of Appeals and the Chancery Court emphasized the
importance of the collection for Nashville and the South.147 The presence of
the collection at Fisk enables local citizens to view it and appreciate the
educational and aesthetic experience it provides. But even if they never visit
the collection, members of the Nashville public may take pride in the presence
of the Stieglitz Collection in their city. They may expect Fisk to maintain the
collection in Nashville and may perceive the collection’s removal as
diminishing their city.
E.

Donors

Since the Stieglitz Collection originated in Alfred Stieglitz’s estate but came
to Fisk through Georgia O’Keeffe’s exercise of an appointment power, a
preliminary question arises as to whose intent matters concerning the
conditions placed on the gift.148 The evidence as to Alfred Stieglitz’s
intentions appears only from brief language in his will. It states that the
collection should reside in public institutions so as to assure public access to
the works for the study of art.149 The will makes no further specification of
recipients or conditions. Georgia O’Keeffe, in exercising her power under the
will to appoint ninety-seven of the works to Fisk, manifested her desire to
safeguard the Stieglitz Collection and keep it intact so as to convey to the
viewer or art student the aesthetic experience of the works as a group.150 These
purposes seem congruent with her late husband’s intent.151 She did not state
why she chose Fisk as a recipient, but at least one statement she made – that it
was “a good thing to do”152 – may imply that she wanted to make a social
statement of inclusion for a leading institution serving the African-American
146

See id. (“The Georgia O’Keeffe Museum is dedicated to perpetuating the artistic
legacy of Georgia O’Keeffe . . . .”).
147 See Georgia O’Keeffe Found. (Museum) v. Fisk Univ., 312 S.W.3d 1, 18 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2009); In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, slip op. at 12-13 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Aug. 20,
2010), available at http://tn.gov/attorneygeneral/cases/fisk/fiskorder.pdf.
148 In considering the cy pres remedy, the Court of Appeals instructed the Chancery
Court to approximate Ms. O’Keeffe’s intent. Georgia O’Keeffe Found., 312 S.W.3d at 20.
149 Id. at 5.
150 See id. at 6.
151 Stieglitz’s will did not require that the collection remain intact. See id. at 5.
152 Georgia O’Keeffe Found. v. Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, slip op. at 9 (Tenn. Ch. Ct.
Feb. 8, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), vacated, 312 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2009).
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community.153 On the other hand, the gift to Fisk came as part of her exercise
of the appointment power as to all the works, motivated by the need to clear
the way for her enjoyment of a life interest in the remainder of the estate.154
The choice of institutional recipients may have mattered to her less than the
fact of transferring the works out of the estate. The scantiness of the evidence
on some critical aspects of her intention raises doubt as to how much to rest
present day decisions on this evidence.
In any event, both Mr. Stieglitz and Ms. O’Keeffe died years ago.
Nevertheless, we give current weight to their intentions, as the law generally
does for the conditions imposed by deceased donors, for several reasons. First,
in accepting the gift with its conditions, Fisk undertook a moral and contractual
obligation to observe them. That obligation continues, although the passage of
time and changes in circumstances may affect the shape of that claim. Second,
and more generally, we fear that the failure to respect donor wishes after they
make the gift will discourage subsequent donors from donating gifts to charity.
But this disincentive should have only modest effect on rational donors who
see that the modification of conditions results from the combination of changed
circumstances and the passage of a long period of time.
F.

The Attorney General

The attorney general acts as advocate for the diffuse public interests that
benefit from charity.155 He may seek to prevent waste or misappropriation of
charitable assets.156 The attorney general has considerable discretion to choose
which aspect of the public interest to emphasize. At times the choice may
slight the best interests of the institution.157 Here, the Tennessee Attorney
General gave top priority to a Nashville situs for the collection. He argued for
a transfer away from Fisk to another institution if necessary to keep the
collection in Nashville, even if that left Fisk without the infusion of cash that
could help Fisk avoid bankruptcy.158

153

See id. at 8-9.
See Georgia O’Keeffe Found., 312 S.W.3d at 5-6.
155 See, e.g., id. at 7 (“The Attorney General . . . sought to intervene to represent the
interests of the charitable beneficiaries, the potential charitable beneficiaries, and the people
of Tennessee . . . .”).
156 See Brody, supra note 6, at 976.
157 See, e.g., id. at 998-99 (questioning the Attorney General’s role in the Hershey Trust
case).
158 In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, slip op. at 18 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Nov. 3, 2010),
available at http://tn.gov/attorneygeneral/cases/fisk/fiskorder11-3-2010.pdf.
154
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The Stieglitz Collection

At the center of the controversy sits the Stieglitz Collection itself. First, its
artistic and historical importance makes a strong claim for proper care and
maintenance. Climate control and security impose substantial costs. Fisk
estimated it currently spends $131,000 annually for these purposes159 and
requires considerably more for “[b]est [p]ractices.”160 All the relevant parties,
from the deceased donors to the present parties, trust that Fisk or whoever
possesses the work will take the necessary steps to ensure proper care of the
collection. Apart from the aesthetic dimension, simple financial prudence
would require a fiduciary to maintain the collection as a financially valuable
asset. Second, the intangible values that the collection represents would have
little consequence unless people viewed and studied the works. Fisk estimated
that the collection received relatively few visits each year.161 Steps to ensure a
wider audience for the collection would generate greater appreciation for the
collection’s value. This consideration strongly counsels against Fisk selling
the collection to a private collector, who would limit public access. A transfer
to another public institution, however, could satisfy the goal of maintaining the
collection’s accessibility.
III. THE LEGAL SETTING
Both courts in the Fisk case gave great weight to donor intent. The legal
rules affecting charities, however, generally reflect an ambivalence concerning
the role of donors in connection with the institutions they support. On the one
hand, living donors generally have no legal standing to challenge a charity’s
activities in court.162 An owner of a property interest in the gift, such as a right
of reverter, could bring suit, whether that party had donated the gift or had
received it from the donor. But the donor of an absolute gift could not.163 On
the other hand, the desires expressed in their lifetime by donors now dead
determine judicial remedies many years later under the doctrine of cy pres.
A.

Donor Standing

An individual who contributes to any charity does so to support activities
the donor prefers, such as distribution of canned goods to indigents, research

159 In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, slip op. at 7 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Aug. 20, 2010),
available at http://tn.gov/attorneygeneral/cases/fisk/fiskorder.pdf.
160 In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, slip op. at 30 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Nov. 3, 2010) (citing
trial exhibit).
161 See In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, slip op. at 7 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Aug. 20, 2010)
(stating that Fisk estimated visitors to all of its art collections at less than 10,000 per year).
162 But with regard to charitable trusts, see UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(c) (amended 2005)
and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94(2) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2009).
163 For a discussion of the standing of a charitable trust settlor regardless of a retained
interest, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94 cmt. g(3).
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on viruses, or performance of live concerts. Generally, donors rely on the
charity to pursue its mission under the direction of its officers and directors or
trustees. Occasionally, donors attach specific conditions for the use of the
property contributed. A donor may retain a reversionary interest that returns
the property if the charity violates the condition.
When a donor contributes property to a charity subject to a specific
condition, the charity accepts an obligation to perform in accordance with the
requirement. Absent the donor’s retention of a right of reverter, however, the
long-standing common law rule has denied the donor the legal capacity to
enforce the condition.164 Ordinarily, only the attorney general, representing the
interest of the general public, has standing to sue the charity.165 A donor could
include a provision allowing donor standing in the gift document.166 On the
other hand, if the donor retained a property right, such as a right of reverter, in
the charitable gift, the donor would have standing to sue for violation of the
condition.167 Thus, for example, a donor who gave a museum a valuable work
of art on the condition that the museum display it perpetually, could not sue the
museum if, after several years, the museum placed the work in its storage
basement. In contrast, if the donor retained or transferred a property right in
the work, as the O’Keeffe Museum claimed had occurred in the Fisk case, then
upon the failure to display the work, the donor or other possessor of the
property right would have standing to enforce the condition.
Income tax considerations may affect the form of a gift made by a welladvised donor. The Internal Revenue Code ordinarily denies a tax deduction
for a gift of a partial interest in property except in narrowly specified forms, so
that retention by the donor of a contingent remainder interest in donated
property could cost the donor the tax deduction.168 But the Regulations make
an exception and allow the deduction if, after property vests in the charity, it
could be defeated by some subsequent act or event “so remote as to be
negligible.”169 If a donor contributes a work of art to a museum on the
condition that the museum display it perpetually, the donor at the time of the
gift may treat the possibility that the museum will fail to do so as sufficiently

164

See Cathedral of the Incarnation in the Diocese of Long Island, Inc. v. Garden City
Co., 697 N.Y.S.2d 56, 59 (App. Div. 1999) (preventing assignee from interfering with land
sale because the original deed did not create a right of reverter); Karst, supra note 1, at 44546.
165 Karst, supra note 1, at 437.
166 Cf. id. at 446-47 (discussing the doctrine of visitation, which could appear in the
charters of charitable corporations and which allows founders and substantial donors to
provide management supervision over the charity).
167 But see Cathedral of the Incarnation, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 59 (denying relief to assignee
because no reversionary interest existed).
168 I.R.C. § 170(f)(3) (2006); see also id. § 170(f)(2).
169 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-1(e) (2010).
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remote and therefore negligible, entitling the donor to a full fair market value
deduction. The existence of a condition does not reduce the amount of the tax
deduction, notwithstanding that a work of art subject to a condition has less
value in the market than the same work unencumbered by a condition. But if
the donor retained a contingent remainder interest in the donated property, the
donor could lose the benefit of the tax deduction. If the donor actually
received the property back from the charity, the donor would have to include it
in income.170 To meet this potential difficulty, donors occasionally have
created a gift to a second charity conditional upon the first charity’s failure to
comply with the donor’s condition. In theory, the second charity supervises
the actions of the first, with the incentive that it will own the property upon a
proven violation.
Scholars have advocated and debated the case for broader donor standing for
decades.171 Courts and legislatures, however, have maintained and sometimes
strengthened the traditional limited standing rules.172 An exception, suggesting
a possible judicial shift, occurred in Smithers v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital
Center.173 The court allowed the donor’s widow and representative of her
husband’s estate to challenge the hospital’s redirection of the restricted
charitable gift.174
Other courts thus far have rejected the invitation to enlarge standing to sue
charities for failure to carry out the donor’s intended purposes. In Rettek v.
Ellis Hospital,175 the federal district court denied standing to the donors’ niece,
who alleged that the donee hospital had misused the substantial legacy.176 In
Hardt v. Vitae Foundation, Inc.,177 executors of the estate who exercised their
discretion to make conditional gifts from the estate to the Foundation sued for
failure to comply with the conditions attached to the gift.178 The Missouri
Court of Appeals held they lacked standing.179 It added that the Attorney
General, whose intervention the Hardts had not sought in this case, had the
duty to protect donor intent and the public interest.180
Legislative projects also have considered the question of donor standing.
Amendments to the Uniform Trust Code reversed the Code’s prior position and
170

See, e.g., Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399, 400, 403 (Ct.
Cl. 1967) (explaining that when a charity returned property to the donor almost twenty years
later, the donor had to include any previous tax benefit as income).
171 See, e.g., Karst, supra note 1, at 445-49.
172 See infra notes 175-187 and accompanying text.
173 723 N.Y.S.2d 426 (App. Div. 2001).
174 Id. at 435-36.
175 No. 1:08-CV-844, 2009 WL 87592 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2009).
176 Id. at *2, *5.
177 302 S.W.3d 133 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
178 Id. at 135-36.
179 Id. at 138-40.
180 Id.

2011]

FISK UNIVERSITY’S STIEGLITZ COLLECTION

895

granted the settlor of a charitable trust standing to enforce the trust.181 Drafters
of the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA),182
which revised the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act
(UMIFA),183 considered a similar provision but ultimately did not include it.184
UPMIFA did carry forward the UMIFA provision that permits a charity to
eliminate or alter a condition by agreement with the donor.185 In the Vitae
Foundation case, the Hardts argued that adoption of the Uniform Trust Code in
Missouri, granting donors standing to sue charitable trusts, should apply as
well to charitable corporations.186 The court rejected the argument, noting that
the state also had adopted UPMIFA, whose drafters had considered and
rejected donor standing.187
B.

Beneficiary Standing

The indeterminate nature of the beneficiaries of not-for-profit entities led
courts to impose even stricter limits on beneficiary standing, lest frivolous
complaints beset the institution. Allowing all potential beneficiaries to
challenge decisions of a not-for-profit institution creates a risk of perpetual
interference with the operation of the institution. The New York courts have
recognized an exception, however, when a particular subclass has a special
interest in the charitable fund and “is sharply defined and limited in
number.”188
The question of beneficiary standing arose in the recent litigation
surrounding the proposal to move the Barnes Foundation into Philadelphia,
contrary to the deceased donor’s express wishes and pursuant to a proceeding
to modify the initial terms of the gift.189 Students in Barnes Foundation
programs sought to appear in opposition to the plan.190 The court denied them
beneficiary standing, but allowed them to present their arguments to the court

181

See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(c) (amended 2005).
UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT (2006).
183 UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT (1972).
184 Marion R. Fremont-Smith, The Search for Greater Accountability of Nonprofit
Organizations: Recent Legal Developments and Proposals for Change, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 609, 621-22 (2007).
185 UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 6(a) (2006); id. § 6 cmt.
186 Hardt v. Vitae Found., Inc., 302 S.W.3d 133, 137 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
187 Id. at 138-39.
188 Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp Found., 479 N.E.2d 752, 755 (N.Y. 1985) (referencing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. c (1959)).
189 See Court Allows Barnes Foundation To Move Collection To Philadelphia,
NONPROFIT ISSUES (Dec. 16, 2004 - Jan. 15, 2005), http://www.nonprofitissues.com/public/
features/ leadfree/2004dec2-IS.html.
190 In re Barnes Found., 871 A.2d 792, 793 (Pa. 2005).
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by way of amicus briefs.191 As nonparties, they could not lodge an appeal
from an adverse ruling.192
C.

Cy Pres

Recognizing that charitable institutions may exist over long periods of time
and circumstances unforeseen by the donor may arise, courts apply the
doctrine of cy pres to charitable gifts. The doctrine permits courts to allow the
institution to alter the use of the gift from the donor’s stated intention in order
to accommodate the new context, but the change must come as near as possible
to the original purpose.193 Many scholars have criticized the influence of the
“dead hand” and have proposed changes in the cy pres doctrine.194 Planning
for a charitable gift can avoid cy pres. At the point of the initial gift, before the
donor has parted with the property, the parties could build into the gift
documents future flexibility in administering the donation.195 After the charity
receives the gift, both UMIFA and UPMIFA allow a donor and a charity to
agree to modify a condition placed on a gift.196 But if the gift instrument has
no such provision or the donor has died, cy pres becomes the charity’s legal
route to modify an onerous condition.
Cy pres, with its emphasis on the donor, fails to give adequate weight to the
interests of other constituencies. Their concerns may enter covertly, as in the
Tennessee courts’ elevation of “Nashville and the South” into a governing
rubric for the Stieglitz Collection.197 Moreover, courts frequently must deal
with thin or cryptic evidence of donor intent. If cy pres requires a court to ask,
“what would the donor do in the face of changed circumstances?,” the answer
comes close to guesswork in such cases. We simply cannot know precisely
what either Stieglitz or O’Keeffe would have directed had they known of

191

Id.; Court Allows Barnes Foundation To Move Collection To Philadelphia, supra
note 189.
192 In re Barnes Found., 871 A.2d at 794-95.
193 Ilana Eisenstein, Comment, Keeping Charity in Charitable Trust Law: The Barnes
Foundation and the Case for Consideration of Public Interest in Administration of
Charitable Trusts, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1747, 1768 (2003).
194 See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, The Low Road to Cy Pres Reform: Principled Practice To
Remove Dead Hand Control of Charitable Assets, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 97, 101, 103,
141 (2007); Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1115-16,
1142 (1993); Roger G. Sisson, Comment, Relaxing the Dead Hand’s Grip: Charitable
Efficiency and the Doctrine of Cy Pres, 74 VA. L. REV. 635, 635-36, 653-54 (1988). See
generally Ray D. Madoff, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE
AMERICAN DEAD (2010) (discussing how legal protections for the dead affect the living).
195 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 430 cmt. b(3) (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2009).
196 UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 6(a) (2006); UNIF. MGMT. OF
INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 7(a) (1972).
197 See supra notes 120-121, 127, 147 and accompanying text.
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Fisk’s current economic difficulties. We can surmise that protection of the
collection and its continued availability to the public would have been a part of
that direction, but we cannot assume more. Would they have favored the sale
to Crystal Bridges of a half interest in the collection? We do not know.
CONCLUSION
The fact that not-for-profit institutions operate without specified
beneficiaries may create too much flexibility in selecting and carrying out the
institution’s mission as represented to donors. On the other hand, donor
conditions to which the institution agreed may turn out, with the passage of
time and changes in circumstances, to restrict the institution unduly. Current
legal doctrine seems to treat both possible problems inadequately. More
liberal standing rules, to allow donors and special subclasses of intended
beneficiaries to bring suit, would provide more assurance of fiduciary
adherence to the original purposes of the charitable gift. Heirs or transferees of
donors, on the other hand, lack the same direct connection to the charity and
often have their own agendas. They should continue to lack standing. The
institution should maintain fidelity to donor conditions until circumstances
have changed. At that point, an inquiry broader than donor intent should
ensue. The court, with the aid of the attorney general and the institution,
should identify the parties whose interests bear on the matter at hand –
including, but not limited to, the explicit concerns that the donors expressed
when they made the gift – and determine the best current outcome.

